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Abstract 
Previous research found that capital structure affects performance when it is 
adapted to the level of environmental dynamism and pursuit of an innovation 
strategy.  The current study reproduces some of these relationships in a more 
recent dataset but also identifies significant nuances across industrial 
environments.  Analyses of a large cross sectional sample and various industry 
sub-samples suggest that other factors have influenced capital structure effects in 
recent years including flexibilities in multinational organization and effective 
strategic risk management capabilities.    
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INTRODUCTION 
Recent strategy research on capital structure effects (Simerly and Li, 2000) found empirical 
evidence of interactive performance relationships between environmental dynamism and financial 
leverage.  A subsequent study demonstrated that capital structure has a comparable influence on 
the performance of innovation strategy (O’Brien; 2003).  These findings are highly relevant in the 
context of the ‘hypercompetitive’ conditions that seem to permeate contemporary business 
environments (D’Avenie, 1994; Thomas, 1996).  To pursue these issues further, the current paper 
presents the results of a study based on more recent data covering the period 1996-2000 across 
firms operating in different industrial environments.   
 
The study replicates some of the effects of dynamism and innovation found in the previous 
studies but also identifies differences across sub-samples of specific industry segments where 
expected effects are subdued or even show inverse relationships.  This has urged the 
consideration of other potential influencers on the strategic effects of capital structure deriving 
from the firm’s ability to respond to changes in environmental conditions.  Given the considerable 
emphasis on potential advantages from flexibilities embedded in multinational organizations 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994) and risk management capabilities (Miller, 1998), this research 
considered potential confounding effects from these factors in addition to dynamism and 
innovation on the relationship between capital structure and performance. 
 
The paper is structured as follows.  First, there is a brief overview of the basic finance and 
strategic management literatures on the choice of capital structure.  Then aspects of agency 
theory, transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, and real options theory are 
incorporated in the development of hypotheses.  Following this, the paper describes an empirical 
study performed to test the hypotheses and the results of the study are presented.  Finally, the 
paper offers a discussion of the findings and provides tentative conclusions.  
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 LITERATURE AND THEORY 
The seminal study by Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that the value of the firm is 
independent of capital structure under certain conditions.  One important condition was perfect 
capital markets, i.e., no taxes, no transaction costs, and no bankruptcy costs.  Another condition 
was information symmetry, i.e., investors and managers have equal information about the firm’s 
investment potential.  In a subsequent paper Modigliani and Miller (1963) eased the conditions 
and showed that under a capital market imperfection where interest expenses are tax deductable, 
firm value will increase with higher financial leverage.  In this situation, the optimal capital 
structure will be determined by a trade-off between increased bankruptcy risk from a higher debt 
load and the tax advantage associated with debt.   
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) analyzed the effects of asymmetric information where internal 
managers know more about the firm’s prospective investments than investors in the market.  In 
this situation, the capital structure may be determined in accordance with a ‘pecking order’ 
approach whereby firms prefer internal sources to fund good projects and only assume debt when 
there is a need for additional funds to finance less attractive projects.  The two perspectives on 
optimal capital structure reach different conclusions.  The ‘trade-off’ perspective argues for a 
proportional relationship between economic performance and leverage due to the tax advantage 
of debt.  In contrast, the ‘pecking order’ perspective, if anything, is more likely to cause an 
inverse relationship between performance and leverage as internal funds are reserved for projects 
with the highest return potentials.    
 
The agency costs associated with equity financing relate to management’s potential divergence of 
productive resources toward employment benefits with no or limited returns to the shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This discrepancy between management and shareholder interests 
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may have implications for the firm’s investment decisions.  Management could obtain financing 
through issuance of new equity to gain flexibility in pursuit of their own objectives and engage in 
questionable investments some of which might represent negative net present values (Jensen, 
1986; Stulz, 1990), that is, it could lead to an ‘over investment’ problem.  Assuming more debt 
might arguably solve this problem.  On the other hand, excessive financial leverage can create an 
‘under investment’ problem as high debt service commitments limit the discretion to engage in 
new business propositions and thereby discourage investment in positive NPV projects (Myers, 
1977).   
 
In an analysis of capital structure decisions, Ward (1993) draws a distinction between business 
risk and financial risk.  Business risk is associated with managing the uncertainty of the firm’s 
business environment whereas financial risk relates to the trade-offs between providers of funds 
(lenders, investors, and shareholders) and the users of funds (firm management).  Here, debt is 
considered riskier to firm management because the regular repayment claims can be enforced.  
Conversely, equity is considered riskier to the investing shareholders because it constitutes 
residual claims that serve as a buffer to ensure the servicing of senior debt obligations in case of 
bankruptcy.  Hence, from the perspective of firm management, the lower financial risk associated 
with equity should be a better way to fund ventures with high business risk because the 
underlying financial buffer to cope with uncertainties in the business environment is larger.  
Conversely, the higher financial risk associated with debt instruments would be better suited to 
fund more stable business activities where the need for a financial buffer is considerably lower.  
This analysis would argue for an inverse relationship between business risk and financial 
leverage, a phenomenon that has been confirmed in some empirical studies using different 
conceptualizations of business risk, such as, variance in sales growth (Thies and Klock, 1992) and 
volatility of demand (Chung, 1993).  
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The choice of the firm’s capital structure is generally considered a central strategic issue and 
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) argue that strategic management can improve our understanding of 
the capital structure decisions.  In this spirit, the following sections provide a brief overview of 
strategy analyses aimed at developing these insights. 
 
Environmental dynamism 
Simerly and Li (2000) integrate agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the resource-
based view in strategic management to explain the environmental contingencies of capital 
structure and provide a comprehensive overview of the related literatures.  From a resource-based 
view, sustainable competitive advantage reflected in excess rents or Shumpeterian returns can be 
achieved through deployment of valuable, rare, unsubstitutable, inimitable, firm specific assets 
(Barney, 1991).  This implies that firms operating in environments characterized by dynamic 
competition must engage in innovative ventures and consider more risky actions to create 
superior performance. This in turn will impose a higher level of business risk on organizational 
activities, which argues for lower financial leverage.   
 
From the perspective of transaction cost economics, transaction costs are lower when they are 
carried out on the basis of standardized assets with low specificity whereas transaction costs are 
higher in the case of firm specific assets.  Therefore, the higher the asset specificity, the more 
economical internal hierarchical coordination should be compared to market clearance of 
transactions.  A higher equity base supports internal hierarchical control whereas a higher debt 
load imposes more market discipline on organizational activities.  That is, equity should be the 
preferred source of financing when asset specificity is high (Harris, 1994).  Since dynamic 
environments arguably are associated with deployment of assets with high specificity, equity 
funding will tend to lower the firm’s transaction costs in this situation and, therefore, should 
constitute a more suitable funding alternative.  Conversely, debt should be more appropriate to 
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fund assets with a low degree of specificity as they pertain to relatively stable environmental 
conditions.   
 
From the perspective of agency theory, debt can be used as a disciplinary tool to ensure that 
managers give preference to wealth creation for the equity holders (Jensen, 1986, 1989).  In this 
set-up, lenders are the prime governance constituents because debt payment obligations and 
restrictive covenants make it more difficult for indebted firms to engage in peripheral and riskier 
business ventures.  Conversely, it will also reduce the number of strategic options available to the 
firm and hence make it more difficult for management to maneuver in a dynamic market 
environment.  In other words, debt can become too restrictive for firms operating in rapidly 
changing industries that require a high degree of strategic responsiveness.  Together, these 
arguments imply that the appropriate financial strategy for firms operating in dynamic industries 
is to reduce leverage to economize on transaction cost and ensure sufficient flexibility to respond 
to environmental change and higher levels of business risk.   
 
Innovation strategy 
The resource-based view can be extended to argue that contemporary hypercompetitive 
environments characterized by ongoing innovation require a strategy driven by idiosyncratic and 
firm specific assets and processes (Barney, 1991).  A transaction cost perspective further argues 
that the higher specificity of assets employed in R&D activities makes equity financing more 
economical and constitutes a better market signal (Santorelli, 1991; Banerjee and Wihlborg, 
2003).  Since information asymmetry between firm managers and external investors is higher in 
R&D intensive organizations, the level of financial slack will also tend to increase (Opler and 
Titman, 1994; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999).  Hence, to succeed with an 
innovation strategy it is necessary for the firm to maintain a certain level of financial slack to 
ensure sufficient and uninterrupted funding sources for R&D investment, new product launches, 
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and ongoing knowledge expansion (O’Brien, 2003).  Therefore, a certain level of equity funding 
that provides a financial buffer will be critical for firms following an innovation strategy and if 
the firms assume too high financial leverage they are expected to perform relatively poorly.  The 
empirical evidence seems to confirm the existence of an inverse relationship between above 
industry average R&D intensity and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Opler and Titman, 
1994; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001; O’Brien, 2003). 
 
Multinational organization  
The wider array of business opportunities across many different national markets should provide 
flexibility to firms that maintain a multinational organization and thereby increase the ability to 
respond to changing environmental conditions.  It has specifically been argued that operational 
flexibilities can allow the corporation to restructure in response to changes in international price 
relations by shifting activities between national entities controlled by the multinational enterprise 
(Kogut, 1985; Rangan, 1998).  The ability to switch business activities across international assets 
can be conceived as a particular real option structure where the value of the implied flexibility 
can be determined on the basis of option pricing theory (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).  The 
flexibility of a multinational organization should allow the corporation to mitigate effects of 
major economic exposures, e.g., associated with changes in relative demand conditions and factor 
costs across national environments (Allen and Pantzalis, 1996; Kogut and Chang, 1996).   
 
Furthermore, a multinational organization may also provide opportunities to exchange diverse 
knowledge between national environments where different insights and perspectives enhance the 
ability to innovate and develop new growth options (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Grant, 
1996).  So, multinationality might be linked to the innovative capacity of multinational diversity 
that forms the basis for strategic opportunities that can increase maneuverability in an uncertain 
global environment (e.g., Mang, 1998; Foss and Pedersen, 2002; Desouza and Evaristo, 2003).  
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This particular view of multinationality has some resemblance to innovation strategy as the firm 
expends resources towards the creation of a more innovative multinational organization.  In either 
case, the multinational organization should increase flexibility and strategic responsiveness and 
thereby improve economic performance.  
 
Risk management 
Strategic risk management practices have evolved in conjunction with the rapid growth of 
derivative instruments traded in financial markets (Rawls and Smithson, 1990) and new product 
enhancements bridging the conventional insurance and capital markets (Shimpi, 1999)1.  These 
instruments cover a wide array of financial markets that allow users to hedge against fluctuations 
in foreign exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices, credit exposures, commercial risk, etc.  
At the same time new types of performance related insurance contracts and contingent capital 
instruments have emerged that serve to reduce the expected cost of financial distress beyond the 
cushion provided by the firm’s equity position (e.g., Colarossi, 2001).  Many of the new risk 
management techniques have been developed within the financial industry, which by definition is 
engaged in the risk management business (e.g., Saunders, 2003).  
 
Effective risk management practices should reduce the volatility of the firm’s earnings and 
thereby reduce the costs associated with potential financial distress.  Another effect of improved 
risk management capabilities would be to reduce ‘under investment’ in the firm caused by debt 
overhang because better risk management will reduce the need for a financial buffer.  If the 
volatility of the firm’s cash flows is reduced and the firm maintains a certain financial cushion in 
the form liquid financial assets and committed credit facilities then funding should always be 
available for positive NPV projects, all the while the lower performance volatility will reduce the 
                                                 
1 According to data assembled by the Bank for International Settlement (BIS), the use of derivative 
instruments has been growing exponentially over the past decade.   
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firm’s average cost of funding.  To the extent an organization is able to manage the uncertainties 
imposed by dynamic environmental conditions that expose business activities and reduce 
variability in firm earnings, the ‘under investment’ problem could be reduced, which provides a 
basic argument for financial hedging (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993, 1994).  
 
By introducing an ‘insurative model’ that incorporates both insurance contracts and equity 
funding as residual claims on the firm, Shimpi (1999) shows that capital management and risk 
management are two sides of the same coin.  A firm needs equity capital to fund its operations 
and establish a certain financial cushion against adverse economic performance, and thereby 
assure different stakeholders about the stability, strength, and soundness of the firm as a going 
concern.  Insurance contracts and financial derivatives serve the same purpose by transferring risk 
exposures that are beyond the discretionary control of firm management.  Hence, insurance 
contracts and alternative risk-transfer instruments constitute important sources of financial capital 
for the firm (Culp, 2002).   
 
Miller (1998) argues that a general strategic management perspective requires that all risk factors 
exposing the firm be considered, such as, competition, sourcing, customers, demand conditions, 
etc.  In other words, the risk management perspective should be extended well beyond a focus on 
foreign exchange and other price risks in the financial markets.  Furthermore, it can be important 
to improve risk management capabilities relating to firm specific strategic exposures because 
many stakeholders are unable to diversify investments that are geared specifically to cater to the 
firm, e.g., buyer and supplier relationships, business partnerships, management and employment 
contracts, etc. (Miller, 1998).  Since competitive exposures often require strategic responses that 
are unique to the firm there is a limit to how far traded financial derivatives can accomplish this 
task.  Financial derivatives exist for many fairly standardized and hence tradable asset classes, but 
do not extend to firm specific competitive factors including environmental contingencies in 
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technology, sourcing, distribution, etc.  To deal with these risk factors, a firm may try to invest in 
the creation of real options that can enhance the firm’s ability to respond to competitive risk 
exposures.  Hence, strategic risk management can be extended to include a real options 
perspective where firms are able to develop opportunities and claims on the future that can be 
evaluated based of assumptions about the underlying risk factors (Leiblein, 2003).  The real 
options differ from financial options in the way the option value is tied to idiosyncratic conditions 
in the firm (McGrath, 1997) as well as firm specific strategy processes may differ in unique ways 
that influence the firm’s ability to exploit the options.  Hence, the presence of real options can 
enhance sustainable value creation since they are based on firm specific assets and processes not 
readily available in the market (Barney, 1991). 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Environmental dynamism imposes higher business risk on organizational activities and therefore 
firm management will impose a higher equity ratio to create a financial buffer of sufficient size to 
absorb the associated performance volatility (Ward, 1993).  Furthermore, firms need a stronger 
equity position to deal with the higher specificity of firm assets required to create excess rents in 
dynamic environments (Harris, 1994; Simerly and Li, 2000), all the while excessive leverage can 
cause ‘under investment’ problems (Myers, 1977).  These arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis. 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 1: Firms operating in dynamic environments (a) have lower financial 
leverage and (b) if they assume a high level of financial leverage it is associated with lower 
economic performance 
 
 
Firms pursuing an innovation strategy require a certain level of equity that provide a financial 
buffer to ensure stability and availability of funds for research efforts, new product launches, and 
on-going development of knowledge based capabilities (O’Brien, 2003).  Innovation is associated 
with the creation of new growth options for the firm including potential process improvements 
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and product introductions (Myers, 1984).  The implied real options give the firm flexibilities that 
can be exploited through a wider choice of alternative actions and better timing of responsive 
strategic moves to the firm’s economic advantage.  This argues for the following hypothesis. 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 2: Firms pursuing an innovation strategy are (a) associated with higher 
economic performance and (b) lower financial leverage, and (c) if they assume a high level of 
financial leverage it is associated with lower economic performance  
 
 
The multinational organization can create flexibilities, e.g., in the form of switching options that 
enable the firm to respond to and manage risks associated with changes in international demand 
and price relations (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).  Within a flexible multinational structure the 
enhanced risk management capabilities should reduce the need for an equity funded financial 
buffer.  On the other hand, building a multinational organization across diverse national settings 
can often be costly (Christophe, 1996) and associated with incremental business risk (Reeb, 
Kwok and Baek, 1998), which argues for equity financing.  Multinationality can also be 
conceived as a form of innovation strategy where international diversity is used to create new 
growth options that extend the strategic opportunities available in different national markets 
(Grant, 1996; Foss and Pedersen, 2002).  In this case, the associated strategic opportunities can be 
exploited to the firm’s economic advantage but development of innovative growth options 
requires a certain level of organizational slack as does the ability to exercise them when 
conditions are favorable.  This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 3: Firms with a multinational organization are (a) associated with higher 
economic performance and (b) lower financial leverage, and (c) if they assume a high level of 
financial leverage it is associated with lower economic performance 
   
 
A firm displaying effective risk management capabilities has lower cash flow volatility, which 
should reduce potential ‘under investment’ problems (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993, 1994) 
and hence improve the firm’s economic performance.  Effective risk management capabilities 
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reduce the need for an equity-based financial buffer and therefore should increase the debt 
capacity of the firm because the cash flow volatility associated with a given business environment 
is reduced (Ward, 1993).  To the extent that real options constitute an element of the firm’s risk 
management processes, there might be a need to maintain some financial slack to ensure that 
option structures continue to be developed and that funding is available for underlying projects if 
and when the real options are exercised.  However, risk management capabilities may also derive 
from use of traded financial derivatives, insurance contracts, and contingent capital arrangements 
as well as more process related flexibilities as opposed to relatively asset intensive real option 
structures.  In this case, the need for a financial buffer is reduced and effective risk management 
should result in higher financial leverage.  If financial derivatives and other traded risk-transfer 
instruments are correctly priced they should not generate excess returns to firms that acquire them 
for hedging purposes.  In contrast, real options have the potential to shield against downside risk 
and exploit upside potential and thereby generate excess returns.  However, there is a need to 
maintain a certain level of financial slack to exploit the potential economic advantages associated 
with real options (Miller, 1998; Leiblein, 2003) and ensure that the underlying business 
opportunities can be realized.  These arguments lead to the following hypothesis. 
 
   HYPOTHESIS 4: Firms with effective risk management capabilities are (a) associated with 
higher economic performance and (b) higher financial leverage, but (c) if they assume a high 
level of financial leverage it is associated with lower economic performance 
   
 
The subsequent section describes an empirical study devised to test the hypotheses. 
 
METHODS 
Sources 
The empirical study is based on a sample consisting of large US firms operating across industries 
identified by their four-digit SIC-codes.  The sample includes the Fortune 500 companies, the 
Stern-Stewart Performance Top 1000 companies, and the 1000 largest companies in Compustat 
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selected on the basis of their market capitalization reported as of May 2001.  These three sources 
produced a total sample of 1357 companies with financial information available from Compustat.  
Data on overseas establishments was obtained from America’s Corporate Families and 
International Affiliates (Dun & Bradstreet), Vol. III, 2001. 
 
Variables 
Organizational performance 
Performance was measured by two financial ratios, return on assets and return on investment.  
Return on assets (ROA) was calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets (including current assets, net property, plant and equipment, and other non-current assets).  
Return on investment (ROI) was calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total 
invested capital (including total long term debt, preferred stock, minority interest, and total 
common equity).  The financial ratios were averaged over the 5-year period 1996-2000 to assess 
longer-term relations as opposed to short-term effects and avoid influences by potential spurious 
events.  This approach is consistent with Simerli and Li (2000) and updates their study, which 
used data for the period 1989-1993.  The analysis defined performance as reported economic 
results as opposed to indicative markets returns, e.g., reflected in market to book value.  Market 
returns are influenced by investor behaviors and therefore could lead to skewed performance 
indicators in the inflated market of the late 1990s (Schleifer, 2000).   
 
Financial leverage 
The firm’s financial leverage was measured as the ratio of debt to equity calculated as all fixed 
charge debt obligations and preferred stock divided by common equity.  The debt to equity ratio 
was averaged over the 5-year period 1996-2000 to control for spurious effects (Simerly and Li, 
2000).  The study assessed leverage based on realized economic performance rather than the 
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market value of equity, which is influenced by investor expectations about the firm’s future 
financial performance and general market prospects.   
 
Environmental dynamism 
Environmental dynamism was measured by an instability index calculated as the standard error of 
the regression coefficient in the regression of total industry sales over the 5-year period 1996-
2000 against a time variable divided by the average value of industry sales to reach a standardized 
indicator of dynamism (Dess and Beard, 1984; Keats and Hitt, 1988; Simerly and Li, 2000).  To 
get more consistent measures of environmental dynamism, the instability indexes were calculated 
on the basis of aggregate industry data identified by the two-digit SIC codes from the complete 
Compustat database and were not limited to the sampled firms.       
 
Innovation strategy 
Innovation was measured by R&D intensity calculated as all costs incurred by the firm to develop 
new products and services divided by total sales.  The firm’s R&D intensity was then compared 
to its industry peers to capture a distinct strategy dimension indicating the importance the firm 
assigns to innovation (O’Brien, 2003).  Hence, we calculated the R&D intensity for each firm in 
the sample, averaged the ratio over the 5-year period 1996-2000, and standardized the firm 
measures within the industries identified by their two-digit SIC codes.  This procedure captured 
the relative emphasis the firms put on innovation as a strategic approach compared to peers within 
their own industries.         
 
Multinational organization 
Multinationality was measured on the basis of the number of foreign subsidiaries and the number 
of foreign countries in which the firm’s subsidiaries are situated (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Reuer 
and Leiblein, 2000).  The measure was calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
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of foreign subsidiaries the firm has and the natural logarithm of one plus the number of countries 
with subsidiaries.  The two numbers were added to indicate diversity in term of national 
environments as well as operational knowledge.  The natural logarithm was applied to adjust for 
skewness and ensure normality.   
 
Risk management 
Risk management was conceived as the extent to which the firm was able to cope with 
uncertainties in the external environment and stabilize the earnings development.  Hence, the 
firm’s adherence to risk management was calculated in two ways.  First, we calculated the 
standard deviation of the firm’s net sales during 1996-2000, which reflects the level of 
uncertainty in the firm’s business environment, and divided it by the standard deviation of the 
firm’s ROA during the same period.  Second, we calculated the standard deviation of net sales 
divided by the standard deviation of ROI during the same period.  The ratios provide direct 
indications of the firm’s ability to adapt to the influence of environmental risk factors and manage 
the associated exposures so as to reduce variability in economic performance.       
 
Analyses 
The hypotheses were tested in multiple regression analyses.  One set of regressions used the 
economic performance measures, i.e., 5-year average ROA and 5-year average ROI, as dependent 
variables and measures of environmental dynamism, innovation strategy, multinational 
organization, risk management, and their interaction terms with financial leverage as independent 
variables.  Another set of regressions used financial leverage as dependent variable and 
dynamism, innovation, multinationality, and risk management as independent variables.  This 
approach is comparable to previous strategic capital structure studies (Simerly and Li, 2000; 
O’Brien, 2003). 
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The relative R&D intensity was used as a measure of the extent to which the firms pursue an 
innovation strategy (O’Brien, 2003), which can be looked upon as the firm’s ability to create 
future growth options (Myers, 1977).  As discussed, the same real options perspective can be 
adopted to the multinational organization (Grant, 1996) and strategic risk management (Miller, 
1998).  To assess this, two indicators were developed as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of announced product introductions made by the firms during the 5-year period and the 
number of patents registered by the firms at the US Patent Office, which have been used to 
measure real options (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004).  The correlation coefficient between the 
innovation and multinationality measures and the two options indicators calculated on the total 
sample were statistically significant and ranged between 0.35 and 0.45 and hence provided some 
credence to the real options perspective applied on these two measures.  The risk management 
measure did not show high correlations with the real options indicators, which seems to indicate 
that the risk management construct captured here reflect use of traded financial derivatives, 
alternative risk-transfer instruments, and supportive management processes as much as potential 
flexibilities associated with real options.    
 
The regressions considered a number of control variables.  The size of the firm reflects past 
success and hence may represent resource availability that could affect the choice of capital 
structure (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Aldrich, 2000).  Hence, firm size was included in the 
regressions (measured as the natural logarithm of total assets to correct for positive skew in the 
data).  Consistent with Simerli and Li (2000) we included two variables reflecting potential 
exposures to agency and transaction cost problems.  Firm dummy 1 indicated firms with average 
annual returns on capital ranging between –2.5 and +2.5 percent and growth in capital below 25 
percent during the 5-year period, with return on capital calculated as operating profit after tax 
divided by outstanding capital at the beginning of the year.  Firm dummy 2 indicated firms with 
returns on capital below –2.5 percent and capital growth below 25 percent.  The dummy variables 
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were assigned a value of 1 for firms belonging to the specific subgroup while all other firms were 
given a value of 0.  Firms belonging to these subgroups have not been able to create returns in 
excess of the cost of capital during the period of study and, therefore, are likely to have agency or 
transaction cost problems that could affect the choice of capital structure.  The market to book 
ratio reflects the potential issue price of new equity in the firm, which might influence capital 
structure decisions (Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 2001).  The market to book ratio has also 
been identified as a potential predictor of market returns (Fama and French, 1992, 1993) and 
hence could influence the economic performance measures used as dependent variables in the 
regressions. 
 
The regression analyses were tested for possible outlier effects and multicollinearity.  Data sets 
causing excessive prediction errors were excluded from the sample in a sequential manner to 
observe potential chages in regression coefficients.  The final sample excluded 34 observations 
where prediction errors exceeded three times the standard deviation, but no material changes were 
observed in regression coefficients compared to calculations based on the full sample.  No 
multicollinearity problems were registered and VIF factors did not exceed 3.4 in any of the 
reported regressions, i.e., well below the level indicating potential multicollinearity problems 
(Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller and Nizam, 1998; Lomax, 1992).  
 
RESULTS 
Statistics and correlation coefficients on the full sample are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 1 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 2 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Average leverage showed a negative association with performance and vice versa (Table 3) and 
seemed to indicate a prevalence for the ‘pecking order’ model in the choice of capital structure.  
Dynamism had a significant positive association with leverage in contradiction with hypothesis 
1a (Table 3).  That is, firms operating in dynamic environments do not seem to reduce financial 
leverage.  The interaction term between dynamism and leverage indicated a negative relationship 
to performance and showed statistical significance in the case of 5-year average ROI.  This 
provides support for hypothesis 1b.  Hence, when firms in dynamic environments assume high 
financial leverage it seems to be associated with lower economic performance. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 3 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Innovation had a positive relationship to performance and showed statistical significance against 
5-year average ROA.  This provides support for hypothesis 2a, i.e., firms pursuing an innovation 
strategy appear associated with higher economic performance.  Innovation had a negative 
relationship to leverage and showed statistical significance against 5-year average ROI.  This 
provides support for hypothesis 2b, i.e., firms pursuing an innovation strategy seem to be 
associated with lower financial leverage.  The interaction term between innovation and leverage 
did not seem to have any discernible relationship to performance, i.e., there is no support for 
hypothesis 2c. 
 
Multinational organization had a significant positive relationship to both performance measures, 
which supports hypothesis 3a, i.e., multinationality seems to be associated with higher economic 
performance.  A multinational organization indicated a negative relationship to leverage but the 
regression coefficients were not statistically significant, so there is no support for hypothesis 3b.  
The interaction term between multinational organization and leverage had a negative relationship 
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to performance and showed statistical significance against 5-year ROA, i.e., there is some support 
for hypothesis 3c.  Hence, multinational firms with a relatively high level of financial leverage 
may be associated with lower economic performance.   
 
Risk management had significant positive relationships to both performance measures, which 
supports hypothesis 4a.  Hence, firms with effective risk management capabilities are associated 
with higher economic performance.  Risk management had a positive relationship to leverage.  
This provides support for hypothesis 4b, i.e., it seems like effective risk management increases 
the debt capacity of the firm and reduces the need for an equity-based financial buffer.  The 
interaction term between risk management and leverage had a significant negative relationship to 
performance, which supports hypothesis 4c.  Therefore, if firms with effective risk management 
capabilities assume a relatively high level of financial leverage it appears associated with lower 
economic performance. 
 
We performed the same regression analyses on different industry sub-samples to investigate 
potential discrepancies across industrial settings.  In manufacturing industries (SIC: 2000-3999) 
we found that dynamism is negatively associated with financial leverage (Table 4), i.e., in this 
sub-sample hypothesis 1a is supported.  However, the interaction between dynamism and 
leverage indicated a positive performance relationship, i.e., there is no support for hypothesis 1b 
in this sub-sample. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please insert Table 4 about here. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The multinational organization and risk management relationships were largely reproduced in the 
manufacturing industries, but risk management showed inverse relationships in the financial 
institutions sub-sample (Table 4).  Among financial institutions risk management showed a 
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negative relationship to performance and was enhanced only in firms with higher financial 
leverage. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Whereas the regressions on the full sample provide support for most of the hypotheses and 
thereby give some credence to the underlying theoretical reasoning, the analyses of specific 
industry sub-samples indicate that there are some discrepancies across industrial settings.  The 
study fails to show that firms operating in dynamic environments pursue lower financial leverage 
possibly because there is a certain reliance on venture capital in emerging industries.  Firms 
pursuing an innovation strategy do seem to perform better and maintain lower financial leverage, 
but the study cannot demonstrate that innovation strategy combined with leverage has adverse 
effects on economic performance.  Again, these findings could relate to a situation where 
innovative ventures are financed as levered investments.  In general, a multinational organization 
is associated with superior economic performance, although this finding cannot be reproduced in 
the manufacturing industry by itself.  There are no significant indications that multinationality is 
associated with lower financial leverage or that a multinational organization with high financial 
leverage is associated with poorer economic performance.  Risk management is associated with 
higher economic performance, lower financial leverage, and the combination of risk management 
and high financial leverage is associated with lower economic performance.  However, among the 
credit intermediating financial institutions the positive performance effect only materializes when 
effective risk management capabilities are used to increase the financial leverage, which provides 
a basis to expand the credit multiplier.  
 
Whereas Simerli and Li (2000) consistently found strong adverse economic effects from higher 
financial leverage in dynamic environments during the period 1989-1993, the results in this study 
are not as apparent, and in certain industry sub-samples, e.g., manufacturing industries, the effects 
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actually turns out to be positive if anything.  The study also fails to show adverse performance 
effects when innovation strategy is debt financed, which is inconsistent with O’Brien’s (2003) 
results covering the period 1980-1999.  O’Brien’s (2003) study used annual firm observations and 
performance measures based on market capitalization as opposed to reported economic results, 
which could partially explain the inconsistent results.  Another reason could relate to changes in 
the managerial imperatives from the 1980s to the second half of the 1990s, which is the period 
covered by the current study.  Firms have continued to compete in increasingly open global 
markets often by establishing a multinational organization (e.g., Govingarajan and Gupta, 2001).  
The emphasis on strategic risk management has also increased considerably throughout this 
period (e.g., Rawls and Smithson, 1990; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993).  Hence, it is not 
inconceivable that firms have been able to utilize financial derivatives and alternative risk-
transfer instruments as well as real options related flexibilities to better cope with the 
uncertainties surrounding business activities in dynamic environments (Miller, 1998).  Hence, the 
results from this study seem to confirm that both multinational organization and risk management 
have had significant influences on the choice of capital structure in recent years.         
 
The dramatic increase in the use of derivative instruments and the recognition of real options, 
e.g., embedded in new business opportunities and multinational organization, reflects increased 
attention to strategic risk management issues.  The proliferation of financial derivatives, insurance 
contracts, alternative risk-transfer instruments, and real options should enhance the firm’s ability 
to increase its responsiveness to environmental change and thereby reduce variability in its 
economic performance (Froot, Sharfstein and Stein, 1993, 1994; Miller, 1998; Culp, 2002).  
However, there seems to be two opposing effects at play that need further scrutiny in future 
research.  The ‘slack resources’ argument for pursuing an innovation strategy (O’Brien, 2003) 
was adopted in this study to explain the capital structure rationale in conjunction with exploitation 
of real options embedded in innovations, multinational organization, and strategic risk 
 21
management.  On the other hand, effective use of real option structures to manage risk exposures 
should reduce the need for an equity based financial buffer. 
 
We argued that the firm needs slack resources in the form of an equity based financial buffer, to 
ensure that real options are continuously developed and to make sure they can be executed 
effectively when market circumstances warrant it.  The ability to develop real options will usually 
require a certain amount of slack resources and the existence of real options is, therefore, likely to 
have an inverse relationship to financial leverage.  Furthermore, the eventual exercise of real 
options implies that the firm invests in the project that represents the growth option as the 
investment constitutes the ‘exercise price’ in the options jargon (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Leuhrman, 1998).  Hence, to fully exploit the flexibilities embedded in real options, the firm must 
have a certain level of financial slack that allows it to execute the underlying business 
propositions in response to changing conditions.  This is in contrast to the use of traded financial 
derivatives that often are used to hedge and smooth cash flows from underlying positions and 
where the premium typically is paid up front and, therefore, constitutes a ‘sunk cost’ at the time 
of exercise.           
 
The fact that multinational organization and effective risk management seem to matter in the 
choice of optimal capital structure may be partially explained by a real options perspective as the 
associated flexibilities increases the firms’ maneuverability and strategic responsiveness (Bettis 
and Hitt, 1995; Miller, 1998).  In contrast, real options seem less important among financial 
institutions where major risk factors relate to the price volatility of financial assets and credit 
exposures that can be hedged in the market through trading in derivative instruments.  However, 
more research is needed to investigate how the strategic risk management effects spill over into 
improved economic performance, and how an explanation based on firm specific real options 
relate to conventional perspectives of innovation strategy and multinational opportunities. 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study based on analyses of a large cross sectional sample of firms operating in 
different industries demonstrate that innovation, multinationality, and risk management all have 
positive associations with economic performance.  However, the evidence does not clarify what 
the optimal capital structure is for each of these strategic approaches although it seems pretty 
clear that effective risk management practices outside the financial industry requires some 
financial slack.  Hence, to achieve economic performance effects from effective risk 
management, financial leverage should not be excessive.  One reason presumably is that that it 
takes a financial buffer to develop real options that underpin effective management of firm 
specific risk exposures as well as financial resources are needed to exercise the options when 
conditions suggest it is opportune to do so.  The study also finds differences between the capital 
structure decisions in specific industrial settings, e.g., manufacturing companies and financial 
institutions, partially affected by differences in financing practices, regulatory constraints, and use 
of traded financial derivatives in the risk management process.   
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Table  1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficientsa  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
           Mean      S.D.      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12    13 
   
 
1   Average 5-year ROA     4.254     5.687        
 
2   Average leverage 113.237 207.858    -0.144**       
  
3   Dynamism      0.007     0.021    -0.033   0.045*     
 
4   Firm Dummy 1      0.081     0.273    -0.015   0.031+ -0.004  
 
5   Firm Dummy 2      0.108     0.311    -0.110**  -0.111**  0.024 -0.107**    
 
6   Size (ln assets)      7.847     1.599    -0.020   0.236** -0.103**  0.005 -0.075**    
 
7   Market/Book      1.821     1.576     0.083**  -0.151** -0.092** -0.037+ -0.038+ -0.405**  
 
8   Innovation      1.707     2.441     0.111**  -0.100** -0.070** -0.004 -0.054* -0.053*  0.252**   
 
9   Multinational      0.861     1.059     0.165**   0.039+ -0.103** -0.001 -0.050*  0.204**  0.213**  0.307**  
 
10 Risk management      5.449     1.946     0.074**   0.223** -0.083** -0.028 -0.142**  0.735** -0.358** -0.189**  0.105**  
 
11 Dynamism*leverage     0.202     6.279    -0.040+  -0.043  0.374**  0.021 -0.005 -0.046*  0.040 -0.021 -0.024 -0.056*  
 
12 Innovation*leverage  -52.223 518.215   0.015  -0.045+ -0.039 -0.006  0.016 -0.056*  0.006 -0.023 -0.021 -0.062* -0.100**  
 
13 Multinational*leverage    -7.546 211.945    -0.033  -0.118** -0.033  0.006  0.015  0.004 -0.010 -0.026   0.035+  0.024 -0.080** -0.033  
 
14 Risk mgt.*leverage   90.775 494.287    -0.098**   0.2869** -0.059*  0.017  0.018  0.205** -0.062* -0.051* -0.008  0.196** -0.109** -0.258**  0.252** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  N=1323,      +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.01 
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Table  2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficientsa  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
           Mean      S.D.      1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11    12    13 
   
 
1   Average 5-year ROI     7.547     8.735        
 
2   Average leverage 113.237 207.858    -0.098**       
  
3   Dynamism      0.007     0.021    -0.038*   0.045*     
 
4   Firm Dummy 1      0.081     0.273    -0.035+   0.031+ -0.004  
 
5   Firm Dummy 2      0.108     0.311    -0.128**  -0.111**  0.024 -0.107**    
 
6   Size (ln assets)      7.847     1.599     0.095**   0.236** -0.103**  0.005 -0.075**    
 
7   Market/Book      1.821     1.576     0.061*  -0.151** -0.092** -0.037+ -0.038+ -0.405**  
 
8   Innovation      1.707     2.441     0.075**  -0.100** -0.070** -0.004 -0.054* -0.053*  0.252**   
 
9   Multinational      0.861     1.059     0.170**   0.039+ -0.103** -0.001 -0.050*  0.204**  0.213**  0.307**  
 
10 Risk management      4.795     1.750     0.170**   0.166** -0.076**  0.015 -0.141**  0.653** -0.286** -0.155**  0.122**  
 
11 Dynamism*leverage     0.202     6.279    -0.061*  -0.043  0.374**  0.021 -0.005 -0.046*  0.040 -0.021 -0.024 -0.056*  
 
12 Innovation*leverage  -52.223 518.215   0.011  -0.045+ -0.039 -0.006  0.016 -0.056*  0.006 -0.023 -0.021 -0.062* -0.100**  
 
13 Multinational*leverage    -7.546 211.945    -0.019  -0.118** -0.033  0.006  0.015  0.004 -0.010 -0.026   0.035+  0.024 -0.080** -0.033  
 
14 Risk mgt.*leverage   61.816 376.713    -0.051*   0.219** -0.043+  0.030  0.024  0.166** -0.041+ -0.038+  0.001  0.086** -0.114** -0.203**  0.274** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a  N=1323,      +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.01 
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Table 3. Regression Analyses – Cross Sectional Samplea   [Standardized Regression Coefficients] 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent variable               ----- 5-year average ROA -----  Leverage              ----- 5-year average ROI -----  Leverage 
   
 
Average leverage  -0.153** -0.146** -0.119** -0.141** -0.137**        -  -0.131** -0.128** -0.121** -0.122** -0.118**        -  
 
Dynamism    0.000  0.002 -0.004  0.002  0.008     0.058*   0.019  0.020  0.022  0.021  0.025**     0.059* 
 
Dynamism*leverage -0.035 -0.033 -0.038 -0.040 -0.037        -  -0.059* -0.057+ -0.060* -0.064* -0.063*        -  
 
Firm Dummy 1   -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.014 -0.015     0.017  -0.041 -0.041 -0.042 -0.039 -0.049+     0.012 
 
Firm Dummy 2   -0.125** -0.121** -0.122** -0.102** -0.094**     -0.106**  -0.132** -0.130** -0.130** -0.112** -0.108**     -0.114** 
 
Size (ln assets)     0.034  0.029 -0.020 -0.094* -0.170**     0.157**   0.150**  0.154**  0.112**  0.054+  0.024     0.236** 
 
Market/Book   0.070*  0.049  0.015  0.090**  0.023    -0.020   0.103**  0.092**  0.059+  0.112**  0.062*    -0.019 
 
Performance         -      -     -     -     -    -0.145**      -    -     -     -     -    -0.121** 
 
Innovation        -  0.079**     -       -  0.075*    -0.041       -  0.041     -      -   0.033       -0.060* 
  
Innovation*leverage      -  0.010     -     -  0.000            -       -  0.011     -     -  0.004           - 
 
Multinational       -      -  0.156**     -  0.138**    -0.040       -     -  0.126**     -  0.115**       -0.046 
 
Multinational*leverage      -      - -0.057*     - -0.038            -       -     - -0.040     - -0.031            - 
 
Risk management       -      -     -   0.215**  0.233**     0.097**       -     -     -  0.174**  0.123**     0.010 
 
Risk mgt*leverage      -      -     - -0.075** -0.053+         -       -     -     - -0.047+ -0.031         - 
 
Multiple R2   0.206  0.220  0.257  0.255  0.303     0.321   0.234  0.238  0.264  0.273  0.299     0.309  
 
Adjusted R2    0.038  0.042  0.059  0.059  0.083     0.097   0.053  0.050  0.063  0.068  0.080     0.089 
 
F-significance   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000     0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000     0.000  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
01 a  N=1323,      +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.
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Table 4. Regression Analyses – Industry Sub-samples  [Standardized Regression Coefficients] 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
               ---------- Manufacturing Industries a ----------                             ---------- Financial Institutions b ---------- 
Dependent variable  5-year avg. ROA  5-year avg. ROI  Leverage 5-year avg. ROA  5-year avg. ROI            Leverage 
   
 
Average leverage  -0.102+ -0.112**  -0.082 -0.109+         -  -0.172** -0.721**  -0.147* -0.271*      -  
 
Dynamism   -0.001 -0.008  -0.028 -0.025     -0.057*  -0.164+ -0.105  -0.196+ -0.176+   0.062 
 
Dynamism*leverage  0.059  0.083   0.067  0.092         -   0.008  0.153*    0.027  0.051       -  
 
Firm Dummy 1   -0.052 -0.044  -0.058 -0.059     -0.008   0.118**  0.065  -0.011 -0.037   0.069 
 
Firm Dummy 2   -0.212** -0.184**  -0.216** -0.190**     -0.122** -0.011 -0.090  -0.159* -0.204**  -0.077 
 
Size (ln assets)     0.080+  0.178**   0.182** -0.030      0.130+  -0.326** -0.170+    0.125  0.033   0.260* 
 
Market/Book   0.088+  0.120*   0.065  0.076     -0.014   0.354**  0.203*    0.062  0.053   -0.010 
 
Performance         -      -      -     -     -0.142**     -    -          -      -  -0.124+ 
 
Innovation        -  0.042        - -0.022     -0.026      -    -           -       -      0.025 
  
Innovation*leverage      -  0.043      -  0.077             -      -    -          -      -          - 
 
Multinational       -  0.080+      - -0.104+     -0.099+      -  0.011          -  0.049     -0.049 
 
Multinational*leverage      - -0.041      -    -0.049          -          -  0.063      -  0.084           - 
 
Risk management       -  0.324**      -  0.246**       0.043          - -0.320**       - -0.251*  -0.144 
 
Risk mgt*leverage      - -0.040        - -0.063          -          -  0.720**       -  0.200       - 
 
Multiple R2   0.276  0.372    0.316  0.388        0.228   0.603  0.680    0.296  0.343   0.309  
 
Adjusted R2    0.063  0.116    0.087  0.129       0.035   0.341  0.437    0.055  0.076  0.089 
 
F-significance   0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000       0.000   0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 a N=509 (SIC: 2000-3999);   b N=203 (SIC: 6000-6999);    +  p < 0.10;  *  p < 0.05;  **  p < 0.01
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